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Introduction
Recent developments in globallabor markets have captured the interest of many labor and international economists. I Many empirical studies have documented the following ~hanges that occurred during the 1980s and that will be referred to as stylized facts (SF) in the present paper. SF(l): The wage ofunskilled workers has declined relative to the wage ofskilled workers.
2 SF(2): The employment ofskilled workers as a fraction of total employment has increased across all manufacturing industries. 3 SF(3): The shift in employment from unskiIIed to skilled workers has occurred mostly within (as opposed to between) four-digit manufacturing industries. 4 SF(4): There has been an acceleration oftechnological change and an increase in R&D expenditures. s SF(S): The gloDal economy has experienced a dramatic increase in openness measured by trade shares. 6 SF(6): Domestic prices have remained roughly constant despite the increase in trade volume. 7 SF(7): The above mentioned changes have been global in character rather than strictly U.S. based developments.
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The search for principal causes of the above-mentioned stylized facts has generated an important debate among economists. Given SF(S), economists initially focused on the role that global integration could have played in explaining SF(I). Earlyempirical studies established a negative correlation between the volume of imports and the relative demand for unskilled workers. 9 This finding was interpreted as a manifestation of the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem which states that a dec line in the relative price of the importable good must reduce the l return to the factor of production that is used intensively in its production. The Stolper.
Samuelson theorem implies that increased trade between a developed (skilled labor abundant) country and a developiIig (unskilled labor abundant) country puts downward pressme on the relative wage ofunskilled workers in the developed country. This North·South trade explanation, however, was successfully challenged by several international economists who pointed out that the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism operates through changes in domestic prices and SF(6) was a sufficient condition to rule out this particular explanation for the rise in wage inequality.lo
These economists also noted that significant intersectoral shifts in employment did not occur [SF(2) and SF(3)], and therefore trade liberalization could not be held accountable for changes in the wage structure. By default, unskilled-labor saving technölogical change became the dominant explanation for the global decline in the relative demand and the wage of unskilled workers.
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While it is not our purpose to dismiss the role of computers (and information technology more generally) as a contributing factor in reducing the demand for low·skilled workers, we will argue that the role of trade liberalization has been underestimated. Instead ofusing the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model with perfectly competitive markets and intersectoral trade based on differences in factor abundance. we develop a Schumpeterian model of North·North trade between structurally similar developed countries. We find that trade liberalization, by itself, can account not only for the observed increase in relative wage inequality SF(1), but also for all six of the-other previously-mentioned styIized facts.
The Schumpeterian model of the paper consists of two countries. Individuals differ in their abilities within each country. An individual can work as an unskilled worker from the time she is bom and receive the unskilIed wage independently of her ability for the duration of her life. Alternatively, she can undergo ·'training," for an exogenous period of time without eaming any income, and become askilIed worker receiving a wage proportional to her ability. The decision to become askiIled worker is endogenous and depends on the relative wage of skilled workers. Individuals with high levels of ability become skilled and constitute the supply of skilled labor.
There is a continuum of industries where finns produce flnal consumption goods using both unskilled and skilled labor. In each industry, firms can upgrade the quality of their products by investing in R&D. The arrival of innovations, that are associated with higher quality products, is govemed by a Poisson process whose intensity is proportional to R&D investment. 12
Free entry into each R&D race results in zero expected discounted profits. A flrm that wins an R&D race is awarded a patent that enables the innovative flrm to earn temporary monopoly profits from selling exclusively its state-of-the-art quality product in both countries. This patent expires when further innovation occurs in the same industry. Thereafter, the previously patented product is competitively produced by flrms in both countries.
We assume that both countries (Home and Foreign) are structurally identical and impose the same ad valorem tariff on all imported goods. Even though both countries are structurally identical, state-of-~e-art quality products are traded in equilibrium. Half of the world industries have Home quaIity leaders and halfhave Foreign quality leaders at each instant in time. These products are exported and compete against Iower quality domestically produced goodS.
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Global trade liberalization (caused by a reduction in the common tariff) increases the volume and the value ofimports.(and exports) as a percentage ofeach industry's shipments.
However, trade liberalization does not affect domestic or foreign consupter prices (Proposition l). Relative product prices remain unchanged because the demand in each industry is unitary elastic by assumption, and products within each industry are perfect substitutes. These are 3 standard features in growth models based on quality improvements. Each quality leader can charge a price that is proportional to her unit cost (the price of followers) with the factor of proportionality equal to a parameter capturing the size of each innovation (the quality increment).
A reduction in tariffs increases the profit margin of each state-of-the-art quality product, but does not affect the price charged expressed in units of domestically produced goods.
Another result of the paper reveals a Schumpeterian version of the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) mechanism which relates changes in the reward (the "price") ofan innovation to changes in the relative wage of unskilled and skilled workers. An increase in the" expected discounted profits of an innovation increases pennanently the wage of skilled workers and reduces the wage ofunskilled workers if and only ifR&D is the skilI intensive activity relative to manufacturing (Lemma l). The Schumpeterian component of this mechanism refers to the "price" of an innovation which is proportional to the flow"oftemporary monopoly profits. The StolperSamuelson component refers to the intensity ranking between the two activities that detennines which of the two factors ofproduction is hurt if the relative "price" of innovation increases.
Proposition l and Lemma l imply that trade liberalization can increase the profitability of " innovations and the trade volume and hurt unskilled workers if R&D is the skilled intensive activity. Relative good prices remain unaffected in this process. A dec line in the relative wage ofunskilled workeI'S"reduces the fraction.ofworkers who choose to remain unskilled and increases the fraction of population that becomes skilled workers. The assumptions of full employment. structurally identical industrles and countrles imply that these changes in employment occur strlctly withi!1 each industry and not across industrles. Therefore, trade liberalization increases the skill abundance in both countrles and generates across-the-board skill upgrading as a result of a decline in the wage of unskilled workers. Finally, an increase in R&D profitability caused by trade liberalization shifts resources from manufacturing to R&D and accelerates the pace technology progresses. Theorem 1states these results formally.
Although trade Iiberalization is consistent with all seven stylistic facts, we briefly examine other causes that could increase the "profitability" of innovation. For example, expected discounted profits could increase as a result of exogenous technical change in the provision of R&D services, or, due to an increase in the size of innovations (loosely related to an exogenous boost oftechnological change). As it tums out, the value of imports (exports) as a share of consumption expenditure depends only on protection and the size of innovations. An increase in the size of innovations reduces the share of imports and increases the relative price of the state-of-the-art products (e.g. the domestic price of imports). Exogenous technical change in R&D services leaves the share of imports unaffected. Thus, these alternative causes faH to pass SF(S), leaving the North-North trade liberalization as the most likely single explanation that is consistent with all seven stylized facts.
Section 2 develops the model and states Proposition l and Lemma l. Section 3 analyzes the effects of global trade liberalization. The conclusions of the paper are stated in section 4 and many algebraic details are relegated to Appendix A.
The Model
This section develops a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with the following features. The innovation process, taste structure, and the rem oval of growth scale effects (to be explained below) are borrowed from Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1996) . In addition, building on earlier work on human capital acquisition by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Borsook (1987), we ~xpIicitly model and endogeneize the skiIl acquisition process.
We also allow both factors ofproduction (unskilled and skilled labor) to ~e employed in both activities (R&D investment and manufacturing offinal products). Moreover, we assume Cournot competition in quantities in final good markets unlike all previous quality ladder growth models 5 that assume Bertrand competition in prices instead. Finally, we assume that only state-of-the-art quality products are protected by patents, instead of examining the case of infinite patent proteetion.
Household Behavior and Sldll Acquisition
There is a continuum ofhouseholds in each country indexed by ability S e [0,1 l. All members ofhousehold S have the same ability level equal to S, and all households have the same number of members at each point in time. Each household is modelled as a dynastic family whose size grows over time at an exogenously given rate n = ~ -ö > 0, where ~ is the birth rate and ö is the death rate. Each individuallives for an exogenously given period of time D > o.
Letting No denote the number of members of each household at time t = O, the population size in each country at time t is N(t) = Noe nt • Because the number ofbirths at time t equals the number of deaths at time t + D [Le. öN(t + D) = ~N(t) for all t], it follows that ö = n/(e nD -l) and ~ = ne nD /( enD -l).
Family optimization considerations determine the allocation of income across final goods, the evolution of consumption expenditure over time, and the decision whether to become skilled or enter the labor force as unskilled workers. In making these decisions, each family takes prices of final products, wages, and the interest rate as given.
The abiiity level S is known to both firms that hire workers and to each worker herself. A worker can enter the labor force as unskilled and eam the wage WL independently of her ability for the duration of her life D. Alternatively, a worker with ability S can enter the laber force after spending an exogenously given period of time T < D in "training" to become skilled. A skilled worker with ability S earns a \Vage wHS for a period D -T > 0, and does not eam any income during her training or apprenticeship. The marginal return per unit of skill W H is independent of the level ofability S. We assume, for simplicity, that the training process does not require any real resources, and therefore the opportunity cost of becoming askilIed worker equals the discounted value offoregone unskilled wage income. We also assume that income is evenly shared within each family (between employed and trainees) so that. at each point in time, consumption expenditure is the same for each living member of a family. 14 The optimization problem of a family with ability e is: 
Equation (1) is the discounted utility ofa household with ability e, where p> O is the constant subjective discount rate, n > O is the exogenous rate of population growth, and p -. n > O is required for the integral in (1) to be weIl defined. Equation (2) defines the instantaneous utility function of each household member, where qeU,w,s) denotes the quantity consumed by an individual with ability e ofa good with j improvements (innovations) in its quality in industry w.
E [O, l] at time s. The parameter A > l captures the size of each quality improvement and Aj denotes the total quality of a good after j innovations. Equation (2) is standard in quality-Iådder growth models with a continuum of indU$tries.
Equation (3) states that per capita consumption expenditure ce(s) at time s must equal the value of all final goods consumed, where p(j,w,s) and qeU,w,s) denote the price and quantity of a fmal product with j improvements in its quality in industry w at time s. Finally, equation (4) states the standard intertemporal budget constraint We(t) is the family's discounted wage income from time t on, and Ze(t) is the value of the family's fmancial assets at time t. (In this model, some fums eam positive profits which are paid to the families that own these finns.) The right-hand-side (RHS) of (4) equals the discounted value of family 's consumption from time t to infinity, and R(t) :: lo tr(s)ds is the market discount factor with R(t) = r(t) denoting the instantaneous interest rate at time t. 15 Appendix B, which is available upon request, derives formally the solution to the family's dynamic optimization problem. This problem can be solved in three steps. First, maximizing subutility (2) subjeet to the expenditure constraint (3) yields unit elastie demand for those produets in each industry with the lowest quality adjusted priees. Because all produets within an industry are perfeet substitutes by assumption, only produets with the lowest quality adjusted priees are purehased by consumers. Second, maximizing diseounted utility (l) subjeet to the intertemporal budget eonstraint (4), taking the diseounted wage income of the family We(t)
as given, we obtain the usual condition
. The differential equation (5) states that per capita eonsumption expenditure grows over time if and onJy if the market interest rate exeeeds the subjective diseount rate.
Third. traininglemployment decisions are made to maximize eaeh family's diseounted wage ineorne. The complexity of the model renders the analysis oflnln:Sitional dynamies intractable, and therefore we will foeus on the balanced growth equilibrium for the most part of the paper. At the steady-state equilibrium, a family member with ability a bom at time t undergoes training and becomes askilIed worker if and only if
The LHS of inequality (6) equals the diseounted wage income of an individual from working as an unskilled worker from time t until her death at time t + D, where r(t) = p and w L , WH remain 8 constant over time. The RHS of (6) is the lifetime income of askilled worker, who eams zero income during her training period and 6w H from time t + T until time t + D, discounted to time t.
Condition (6) can be used to deteImine endogenously the division of population among skilled and unskilled workers. Because the RHS of (6) increases in 6, whereas the LHS is independent of 6, there exists a level of ability denoted by 6 0 such that (6) holds as an equality.
All families (and individuals) with ability lower than 6 0 choose to remain unskilled, and all families with ability greater than 6 0 undergo training and enter the labor force as skilled workers.
Setting (6) to hold as an equality and solving for the Iong-run value of e o , we obtain
where a is the expression in square brackets in (7). Because a > l and O < 6 0 < 1 always holds in equilibriwn (as we will later establish), equation (7) implies that w H 6 0 > W t and that w';Wt > l.
The wage of askilIed worker must always be higher than the wage of any unskilled worker. An increase in the duration of training T or in the relative wage of unskilled workers WdWH raises the fraction of population that chooses to remain unskilled 6 0 , The supply of unskilled labor in each country at time t equals the members of population that choose to remain unsldlled
The labor endowment of skilled workers at each instant in time H(t) is derived as follows:
A fraction (l -6 0 ) of each country' s population train and become skilled workers, and therefore (l -6 0 )N(t) individuals either work as skilled workers or are training to become skilled workers in each country at time t. In this. subpopulation, the skilled workers are the older individuals.
namely, tho~e individuals that were bom between t -D and t -T:
The average skillievei of workers that have fmished 9 training equals ~ l + 8 0 )/2, and therefore the supply of skilled labor, measured in efficiency units.
at time t is given by
where cp < 1 depends only on the parameters of the model. 16
It is obvious from equations (7), (8) and (9) that a dec line in the relative wage of unskilled workers decreases 8 0 and L(t) and increases H(t) resulting in a rise of skilled labor abundance H(t)lL(t) in each country. This is a standard result in models with variable factor endowments (e.g. Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) and Borsook (1987». In the long-ron, each economy's factor endowments grow at the same rate as the global population because 8 0 is constant over time:
. .
Product Markets and Trade
There is a continuum ofindustries in each country indexed by w E [0,1]. Manufacturing of fmal products uses unskilled and skilled labor (measured in efficiency units) according to a constant retums to seale technology described by the following eost funetion:
where A(WL,W H ) is the unit cost function and Q is the total output produeed .. A(wL'w..) is an inereasing and concave function with AL = aAlaw L and AH = aAlaw H denoting the unskilled and skilled labor requirement per unit of output respectively. We assume that (10) is identical across industries and across different quality levels, and we will use the marginal (and average) costs of manufacturlng as the numeraire in the model:
We will refer to finns producing the state-of-the-art quality produet in an industry as quåIity leaders, as opposed to quality followers that know how to produce a produet of quality 10 one step below the highest quality good. Wben a ftnn wins an R&D race and becomes a quality leader, it receives a patent to exclusively produce the new product and sell it to all consumers in the world. This patent expires when further innovation occurs in the industry. All products that are not protected by patents can be produced competitively in both countries.
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We assume that both countries impose a common ad-valorem tariff t' on all imports. This common tariff is the only policy instrument used, and the tariffrevenues are distributed to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Firms take the common tariff as given when maximizing .
.
proftts. Each quality leader has market power because it holds a patent protecting the s~te-of-
the-art quality product in each industry. Unlike other models of growth through quality improvements that assume Bertrand price competition, we assume that each quality leader competes with quality followers in a Cournot fashion by setting·quantities.
Consider a Home quality leader that en gages in Coumot competition with foreign and domestic foIlowers. The analysis of a Foreign quaIity leader is identical because ofstructural symmetry between the two countries. Because unit costs ofaIl followers are identical (and equal to unity), any positive tariffimposed by the Foreign govemment on imports from Home becomes prohibitive for Home foIlowers. Given this market segmentation in inferior quality products, the Home quaiity leader competes in the Foreign market only with Foreign foIlowers, and in the Home market only with Home foIlowers.
In the Foreign market the Home leader faces an ad valorem tariff t' > O. Denote with Q, . the output of the Home leader sold in the foreign market, and let Q; be the output of Foreign followers. We will denote with an asterisk variables and functions in the Foreign country. Because the Home quality leader produces a good Å times the quality of the good produced by followers, consumer arbitrage requires that p,(1 + 1:) = ÄPr' where p, is the Home consumer price of the state-of-the-art quality product, p,(l + 1:) is the domestic price of the same Il good in the Foreign country, and p; = A(WL,W H ) = l is the price charged by Foreign followers since free entry prevails in the inferior quality product market. The market demand for a typical product is unitary elastic' and therefore
where c·(t) is the economy-wide consumption per capita expenditure in the Foreign country. The RHS of (12) equals total quantity demanded expressed in units of the state-of-the-art quality product (i.e. one unit of Q," is equivalent to III units of Qf·).
Assumption (11) implies that the instantaneous profits of a Home leader eamed in the Foreign market are:
where (12) has been used to substitute for P,. Maximizing (13) with respect to Q,' yields the best reply function of the Home quality leader in implicit form:
Because perfect competition prevails among Foreign followers, the zero-profit condition
Pf' = l determines the price of imports in the Foreign market p,(1 + 1:) = lp," = A..
. (14) • (15) Solving (14) and (15), we obtain the Coumot equilibrium quantities of imports Q," and domestic production Q; in the Foreign market:
Substituting (16) and (17) into (13) yields an expression for the equilibrium instantaneous profits of a Home quality leader from expons
Because a Home quality teader faces segmented markets, the analysis of Coumot quantity competition in the Home market is identical to the analysis in the Foreign market where 't = O.
Therefore, in the domestic market a Home quality leader charges a price equal to p, = Å, Home followers make zero profits and charge Pr = l, and the quantities produced are given by
The maximum instantaneous profits of a Home quality leader at Home are obtained by setting
where c(t) and N(t) are consumption expenditure per capita and population in the Home country.
Structural symmetry across the two countries implies that c(t) = c·(t) and N(t) = N"(t).
Therefore, each quality leader (Home or Foreign) exports the state-of-the-art quality product and obtains global instantaneous profits
There are several interesting features of the Coumot product market equilibrium. First.
only the state-of-the-art quality products are traded. In other words, the quality of imported goods is always higher than the quality of domestically produced goods. The pattem of trade depends on whether a Home or a Foreign firm becomes a quality leader, an event that is purely random because the equilibrium levet of R&D investment is the same in both countries.
Bhagwati (1995) has proposed the notion of "Kaleidoscopic" comparative advantage which is similar to the present formulation of R&D generated trade. Second, all followers charge the same price Pr = P; = 1 which is used as the numeraire, and all quality leaders charge a price equal to P, = p,. = Ä since they are constrained by domestic production of inferior quality goods that are perfect substitutes. Third, trade Iiberalization caused by a reduction in 't does not have any effects on prices (domestic and international), but increases imports (exports) and instantaneous global profits of quality leaders. A reduction in the common tariff reduces the domestic output and manufacturing employment in protected markets. The common tariff becomes prohibitive for 't ~ Ä-l, and therefore we will assume that O ~ t ~ Ä-l in subsequent analysis.
The value of imports (exports) as a percentage of consumption expenditure is an appropriate measure of trade liberalization that captures the economy's openness:
The following proposition states the conclusions of the above-mentioned remarks: 
R&D Races
There are sequential and stochastic R&D races in each industry w E [0, l l. These races result in the discoveryofhigher quality fmal products. Unskilled and skilled labor are combined through a constant returns to scale production function to generate R&D services. Workers are perfectly mobile across industries and activities with unskilled workers perfonning unskilled jobs and with skilled workers performing skilled jobs. All fInns participating in a race face the same production function of R&D services, and there is free entry into each race. R&D services are not traded between the two countries by assumption.
A fInn i which engages in R&D in industry w at time t and discovers the next higher quality product with instantaneous probability Ij(w,t)dt, incurs the R&D cost flow:
where B(wL,w.J is a standard unit cost function derived from a constant retums to scale production function, and X(w,t) is a function that captures the difficulty of conducting R&D.
The tenn in square brackets equals the unit cost ofR&D services Ij(w,t).18
We assume that the retums to R&D investment are independently distributed across fInns, across industries and over time. Therefore, the industry-wide instantaneous probability of success in industry w at time t is I(w,t)dt = [~Ii(W,t)]dt in the Home country and We assume two alternative speciftcations of X(w,t) in order to remove the intertemporal scale effects of growth and add more empirical relevance to the growth component of the medel.
In the fIrst specifIcation, R&D starts being equally difficult in all industries (X(w,t) = l for all IS w), and the level of R&D difficulty grows according to
where IJ. > O is a constant. This specification of R&D difficulty captures the notion that ideas (25) that are easier to discover tend to be discovered earlier in time. 19 We call the resulting model the TEG one because trade liberalization has only ''temporary effects on growth."
In the second specification, the difficulty of conducting R&D is proportional to the size of the global market measured by the number of consumers in both countries
where k > O is a constant. This specification captures the idea that it is more difficult to introduce successfully new products and to replace old ones in alarger market. 20 We call the resulting model the PEG one because trade liberalization has "permanent effects on growth".
There is a global stock market that channels consumer savings to firms engaged in R&D.
Because there is a continuum of industries with simultaneous R&D races, consumers can diversify completely the industry-specific risk and receive the instantaneous interest rate r = p.
Each firm engaged in R&D issues a security that pays the flow of monopoly profits if the firm wins the R&D race and zero ifit does not win the race. Let vet) denote the expected discounted profits of a successful firm (i.e. quality leader) in industry w at time t. Overa time interval dt.
the shareholder of a stock issued by a successful R&D firm receives a dividend 7t(t)dt and the value of the firm appreciates by dv(t) = v(t)dt. Because each quality leader is targeted by R&D firms in both countries that try to discover the next higher quality product, this shareholder suffers a loss vet) if further innoyation occurs. This event occurs with instantaneous probability (l(t) + nt»dt. whereas the event of no innovation occurs with probability l -(l(t) + r(t»dt.
Efficiency in the stock market requires that the expected rate of return of a stock issued by a successful R&D firm must be equal to the riskless rate of return which is the instantaneous interest rate:
Taking limits as dt-O, we obtain v(t) = _____ 7t(.;..,;t)=--_ _ _ r -I(t) + 1 O(t) -(v(t)/v(t» Global instantaneous profits eamed by quality Ieaders are appropriately discounted using the (27) instantaneous market interest rate, the instantaneous probability ofbeing driven out of business by further innovation (the creative-destruction effect), and the growth of expected discounted profits due to economic expansion caused by population growth.
Denote with v( w"t) the expected discounted value of monopoly profits (27) in industry c.u at time t, and consider firm i located in the Home country and engaged in R&D. That firm chooses R&D services Ii to maximize expected discounted profits.
where v(c.u,t) can be thought ofas the "price" ofan innovation and the second term equals the instantaneous costs ofproducing Ij(w,t) R&D services. Free entry into each R&D race drives the expected discounted protits down to zero and generates the following R&D condition:
Abstracting from X( w,t), which serves the purpose. of removing the scale effects, expression'
S(w,t) can be thought of as the "relative price" of an innovation because v(w,t) is the expected discounted profits of a quality Ie~der. Letter S stands for "Schumpeter-Stolper-Samuelson" and denotes the Schumpeterian version of the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) mechanism which is stated in the following lemma. Proof: See Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates the detennination ofwages for the ease ofR&D investment being the skill intensive aetivity relative to manufaeturing of final produets. Coneavity of unit eost functions A(WL'W~ and B(WL'W.J imply that equations (11) and (28) latter is defined by setting 6 0 = l in equation (7) and imposes a lower bound on the relative wage ofskilled labor.~1 IfEo eoineides with El' then there is no incentive for individuals to become skilled workers through costly training. In Figure 1 , point E o lies to the {eft of El to illus~te that the wage of skilled always exeeeds the wage of unskilled workers.
It is obvious from Figure 1 that an increase in the priee of innovation S raises the wage of skilled workers and reduces the ~age ofunskilled workers by shifting B(WL'W.J = S upward, if and only ifR&D is the skill intensive activity (Le. eurve B(-) = S is fla~er than curve A(-) = I).
The increase in the relative wage of skilled workers reduces 6 0 and increases the relative abundance of skilled labor and the proportion of population that ehooses to become skilled workers. Therefore, an increase in the price of innovation increases wage inequality and results in across-the-board skill upgrading if and only if R&D is the skill intensive activity.
The Schumpeterian version of the Samuelson-Stolper mechanism provides a novel explanation for the factor "bias" of technological progress. Whether an acceleration of acrossthe-board technological change (caused by an increase in the reward to innovation) is skilled or unskilled-worker biased depends precisely on the relative intensities of the two activities.
Although unskilled-Iabor saving technological change is a sufficient condition that might have generated the observed changes in the relative wages, the above anaIysis suggests that it is hardly a necessary one. Trade liberaIization exercises an upward pressure on S through its positive impact on the instantaneous profits of all quality leaders. However, S is an endogenous variable that depends on virtually all parameters of the model in addition to R&D difficulty X and global R&D investment. This is the reason why the above results are stated as a lemma instead of a theorem. The following subsection introduces the factor-market-equilibrium conditions which close the model and allow us to analyze the properties of the steady-state equilibrium.
Faclor Markels
We assume wage flexibility and perfect mobility offactors ofproduction across industries and activities. These assumptions imply that the supply and demand for skilled and unskilled labor are equalized at each instant in time. Because both countries are identical in all respects, weconcentrate on the derivation of equilibrium in the Home country. Equation (8) provides the supply ofunskilled labor, whereas the demand for it consists oftwo components:
unskiIled labor employed in R&D and unskiIled labor employed in manufacturing of final products. We consider the determination of each component of demand below.
The demand for unskilled R&D labor targeting industry w at time t is derived from (24) through Shephard's lemma and equals BL(wL,wu)X(w,t)I(w,t) where BLX = (aBlawL)X is the unskilled labor requirement per unit of R&D services, and I = tl i is industry-wide R&D i investment. Because R&D races occur in all industries and the measure of all these identicå.t industrles equals one, BLXI is also the economy-wide demand for unskilled labor employed by finns engaged in R&D. imports. In Home import-competing industrles production equals Qf' given the structural symmetry between the two countries. Therefore, the total output produced in each country is
where q is the ""average" quantity of final output produced in each industry. The economy-\\oide demand for unskilled labor in manufacturing is therefore AL(WL,WH)q, and tlie full-employment condition of unskilled labor is
Equation (9) prov ides the supply of skilled labor, and its demand is derived by the same procedure as the demand for unskilled labor, the only difference being that the industry-wide cost functions are differentiated with respect to the wage of unskilled labor. Therefore the fullemployment condition of skilled labor is
2 o q,N(t) = AH(wL'wH)q + BH(WL,wH)XI.
(31)
Equations (30) and (31) constitute the basic conditions that determine the long-run equilibrium of the medel. 
Steady-State Equi/ibrium
where 21 = I + r due to structural symmetry between the two countries, and where
is the inverse of instantaneous profits per unit of average final output and depends only on the level ofprotection and the size onnnovations. 22 It is obvious from (33) that an increase in protection increases 1fI(1").
Equations (7) and (11) (34) is the locus ofx and 6 0 that are consistent with full employment ofunskilled labor, where I = nl2J.L. This graph is upward sloping and starts at the origin because x = 6 0 = O satisfy the equation. An increase in 6 0 , induced by an increase in the relative wage of unskiIled workers, reduces the demand for unskilled labor and increases its supply for any fixed level of x. Th~ the LHS of (34) exceeds the RHS and an increase in x is required to balance both sides of equation (34) and to restore equilibrium in the unskilled labor market.
The graph of equation (35), which corresponds to the full-employment condition of skilled labor, starts at 6 0 = l and is downward sloping. An increase in 6 0 , caused by a reduction in the relative wage of skilled workers, increases the demand for skilled labor and reduces its supply for any given value ofx. A reduction in x is required to reduce the RHS of(35) and restore equilibrium in the skilled labor market. The unique intersection of (34) and (35) deterrnines the steady-state values of'x and 6 0 e (O, l) in the TEG specification of the medel.
A sufficient but hardly necessary condition that guarantees the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium in the TEG model is that
lim g(6 0 ) < 00, where
This condition is satisfied for Cobb-Douglas production functions and for the class of CES functions where both inputs are essential for production. Figure 3 illustrates the unique steady·state equilibrium in the PEG model. Assumption (26) fixes the value of R&D difficulty per capita x = k. Because the RHS of (34) and (35) are increasing in R&D investment I, the graph of (34) is upward sloping and the graph of (35) is downward sloping as in the case of the TEG specification. These curves intersect the vertical axis above the origin and below point 6 0 = l. Condition (36) and a low value of k (i.e. low level of R&D difficulty per capita) guarantee the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium in the PEG model.
Long·run Growth
The unique steady-state equilibrium in both the TEG and PEG models exhibits constant growth rate of each consumer's utiIity caused by the perpetual introduction ofhigher quality produets. By substitutin~ for consumer demand (C(t)!A) into a representative consumer's static utiIity function, we obtain log u(t) = log c(t) -log A + 10 1 log Aj(<.t),I)dw, where j( w,t) is the number of quality improvements in industry w at time t. The integral in this expression grows over time in the steady·state equilibrium as new products are introduced. The value of this integral equals 21t log A, where fo1j(W,t)dW = 2It equals the expected value ofj(w,t) and 21 is the steady-state intensity of the Poisson process that govems the arrlval of innovations. Thus. in the steady-state equilibrium, each consumer's utility grows at the detenninistic rate
In the TEG model, the R&D intensity I depends only on parameters n and Il, and therefore trade liberalization has only transitional growth effects, In the PEG model, any shift in either or both curves of Figure 3 generates long·run growth effects. In both modeis, positive 23 population growth does not drive the long-ron R&D intensity and per capita growth to infinity.
Trade Liberalization, Relative Wages, and Economic Growtb
The mam result of the paper is established by the following theorem: We are now in the .position to state intuitively the general equilibrium effects of global trade liberalization. Trade liberalization increases the profitability of new-product innovations for any. given levels of R&D difficulty and R&D investment. It also increaSes the opennessof .
. the global economy measured by the share of trade in aggregate consumption (Proposition l).
The increase in R&D profitability increases the "price" of innovation S at the initial values of I and x. An increase in S induces resources to move from manufacturing of final goods to R&D investment and increases the pace of global technological progress temporarily or permanently depending on whether the TEG or the PEG specification is used. These indirect generalequilibrium effects on I and x do. not reverse the initial increase in the price of innovation which remains higher than its initial value.
The long-ron increase in S affects relative wages and the supplies of unskilled and skilled increases the relative price of domestic goods and decreases economic openness (Proposition l), contrary to SF(S) and SF(6). Similarly, a reduction in k leaves both relative domestic prices and
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the openness of each economy intact, contrary to SF(S).24 Consequently, technical change alone represents an unlikely explanation for all seven stylized facts that characterized the global economy in the 1980s, although in conjunction with trade liberalization technica1 change might have amplified some observed changes.
Conclusions
The analysis of this paper challenges several prevailing explanations for the decline of the relative wage of unskilled workers during the 1980s. Many economists have excluded trade liberalization as the cause of this change based on the fact that domestic relative( prices ~ve not declined. Other economists have adopted the view that competition from the South must have been responsible for the dec line in the relative wage ofunskilled workers (e.g. Wood (199S)).
A major insight of our analysis is that in imperfectly competitive markets, where
Schumpeterian competition determines the pace of technological progress, changes in relative prices represent only one channel that lioks wages to trade liberalization. In these markets, expected discounted profits of innovating play the same role as the domestic relative price in the conventionai Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson medel. Therefore, even if relative prices remain unaffected by trade liberalization (as in this model), a reduction in global tariffs that increases the profitability of R&D generates changes in relative wages whose signs depend precisely on the Stolper-Samuelson condition of intensity rankings between R&D and manufacturing activities.
-We appropriately call the relationship between the relative price of innovation and the returns to factors of production the Schumpeter-Stolper-Samuelson mechanism.
Another new insight of the analysis is that unskilled-Iabor biased technological change is not a necessary condition for a reduction of the relative wage of unskilled workers. Any increase in the profitability of innovation that results in higher R&D investment and acceleration of technological change can affect adversely the wage income of unskilled workers if and only if R&D is skilI intensive relative to manufacturing of fInal goods. The structure of the model supports the view that a North-North trade explanation of wage changes cannot be excluded by the evidence. IntroduciIig asymmetries in country size or in the distribution of abilities across countries could allow the model to address the nature ofNorth-South trade effects on wages. 25 We are anxious to point out that our analysis does not advocate protection as a remedy for raising the standards of living of unskilled workers. In the context of our model, protection would increase the wage ofunskilled workers (ifR&D is skill intensive), but this is a levet (as opposed to growth) effect. Protection slows temporarily (in the TEG model) or permanently (in the PEG model) the growth in the standards of living of all workers measured by the growth in utility. In addition, protection retards the formation of human capita! by increasing the fråction of population that remains unskilled in the long runa Therefore, the income distribution leveltype benefIts of protection should be weighted against the intertemp·oral costs of lower growth in living standards and lower human capita! formation. Welfare analysis can provide some policy guidelines, but the transitional dynamics of the model are complicated, and we suspect that formal welfare analys is would be theoretically intractable.
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Endnotes l. Deardoffand Hakura (1994), Burtless (1995) , and Richardson (1995) provide excellent overviews of these studies and the evidence.
2. The real hourly wage of male workers with 12 years of schooling dropped by 20 percent (Freeman (1995», and wage eamings differentials between high-school and college graduates in the U.S. rose by more than 10 percent (Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994».
3. Employment ofproduction workers in U.S. manufacturing dropped by about 15 percent, whereas the employment of non-production workers increased by 3 percent ( 7. There is no unanimous agreement among economists on the behavior of domestic relative prices during the 1980s. Richardson (1995) reports that Lawrence and SIaughter (1993) found unchanged relative prices. Sachs and Shatz (1994) found a small dec line in relative prices, whereas Feenstra and Hanson (1994) found increases in domestic prices relative to foreign,ones. We argue that trade liberalization can affect the wages independently of changes in relative prices, and therefore SF(6) expresses the view of international econ.omists that have argued against a trade explanation for the decline in unskilled wages.
8. Richardson (1995, footnote 1) cites several studies that have documented the dec line in relative wages ofunskilled workers in several advanced and less developed countries. In most of continental Europe, where labor markets are characterized by wage rigidities. the reduced demand for low-skilled workers manifested itself in the form of increased unemployment. (See the EcOnomist, September 28. 1996, p. 24, and Davis (l996a». 9. Borjas and Ramey (1994) , for example, report a significant negative correlation between the relative wage ofunskilled workers and net imports of durable goods as a percentage ofGNP based on time-series evidence from the U.S.
10. According to Deardoff and Hakura (1994) , "those studies that have related the changes in factor prices to, say, the volume of trade cannot therefore be said to have been necessarily applying the Stolper-Samuelson theorem." Bhagwati (1995) reflects the same view when he E-2 states "Thus, I find it difficult to accept the argument. .. that almost all "quantity" data point towards trade as the somce of the problem and that it is only "prices" that do not conform.
To say that is to say that, in a production of Hamlet, only the Prince was missing, all else Was fine!". Berman et al. (1994) , Krugman and La'Wrence (1994), Bhagwati (1995) and Davis (l996b) among others have proposed this explanation. The Economist (September 28, 1996, page 28) reports that economists polled at a 1995 New York Federal Reserve conference concured by a margin of four to one that technology was more important than trade in explaining widening wage inequality.
Il.
12. We model product instead of process innovation for several reasons. First, process and product innovations are isomorphic in models of endogenous technological. progress. Second, Scherer (1983) reports that about 75 percent of company financed R&D aims at . product innovations. Third, empirical studies of wage earnings inequality have emphasized the roleof computerization in reducing the relative demand for unskilled labor. Most innovations in the computer industry take the form of better products.
13. During the 1980's many U.S. industries faced import competition from higher quality products produced abroad (e.g. semiconductors, automobiles, steel, machine tooIs). In all these industrles technological competition between U.S. firms and their foreign counterparts resulted in the deterioration ofU.S. international competitiveness. All these industries experienced changes in trade barriers during the 1980s.
14. The assumption that all family members have identical abilities raises the standard question ofhow families with skilled workers finance consumption at time zero. The existence of educationalloans, or the assumption that abiIities are uniformly distributed within each family resolve this issu~ without altering the properties of the model.
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. Differentiating (4) with respect to time yields the standard flow budget constraint :le = we + rZe -c e -nz e , where Ze and We denote the per capita financial assets and the wage income of a household member respectively.
16. Setting D-oo yields the special case ofinfinitely lived individuals where a = ePl' > l and tJt = e-nT < l. Equations (7), (8) and (9) are not affected qualitatively, and the results of the paper hold in this case as weIl.
17. Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) used a similar assumption in a model ofNorthSouth trade and growth. This assumption implies strong knowledge spillovers within each industry and across countries, and it is consistent with the spirit of the Heckscher-OhlinSamuelson model which assUmes identical technologies across countries. Dinopoulos and Segerstrqm (1996) assumed that each quality leader receives an infInite-duration patent to analyze the dynamic effects of contingent tariff proteetion.
18. Equation (24) is the cost function associated with the following production function ofR&D services: Ij(u>,t) = Fs(Lj,Hj)lX, where F s (') is a constant retums to scale production function and Lj(u>,t), ~(u>,t), X(u>,t) are the amount ofunskilled labor, the amount ofskilled labor, and R&D difficulty in industry U> at time t E-3
19. Segerstrom (1995) has proposed this formulation of R&D difficulty.
20. Dinopoulos and Thompson (1996) 23. Parameter Å enters the model only through function lJt'('r,Ä) which is decreasing in Ä. In the PEG model, the RHS of (34) and (35) increase in x = k. Therefore theorem l applies to an increase in Å or a reduction in k as weIl. It is worth noting that because x/x = n in the TEG. model, a change in Il is not equivalent to exogenous technical change in R&D, but reflects changes in the long-run value of R&D investment.
24. We also analyzed the effects of exogenous technological change that increases the relative demand for skilled labor in manufacturing (Le. an exogenous increase in the skill intensity of manufacturing for any given value of the relative wage ratio). This type of technical change has been associated with increased use of computers in manufacturing. In the case of CobbDouglas manufacturing and R&D production functions, an exogenous increase in skill intensity ofmanufacturing increases wage inequality, but it is also likely to slow technological change if R&D mainly employs skilled workers and most of the labor force is unskiIled. In addition, this type of exogenous technical change leaves the openness of the economy unaffected contrary to SFS.
25.
Although a North-North trade explanation is consistent with the seven stylized facts in the 1980s, other studies have provided alternative trade-based explanations for the dec line in the . relative wage of unskiIled workers. Davis (1996a Davis ( . 1996b has examined the impact of trade and technology in a two-country global economy with one country experiencing unemployment based on an institutionally fixed minimum wage for unskilled workers. F eenstra and Hanson (1994) have analyzed the impact of foreign investment and outsourcing on relative wages in a model of differentiated intermediate products. Bhagwati (1995) has proposed a North-North trade explanation based on shifts in international competitiveness that are causing higher labor tumover and unemployment among unskilled workers. Richardson (1995) has also emphasized the dichotomy between consumption and investment goods in a model of trade, technology and relative wages. The present paper contributes to this literature by focuslng on 9ynamic aspects of international competition and by highlighting the Schumpeter-Stolper-Samuelson mechanism that !inks trade volwnes to relative wages independently of relative commodity prices. Totally differentiating equations (11) and (28) and solving for the change in each relative wage with respect to a change in the price of innovation yields
The denominator in (Al) and (A2) is positive (negative) ifR&D (manufacturing) is skill intensive. The absence of factor intensity reversals guarantees that the sign of the denominator is the same for all values of the relative wage ratio. This completes the proof of part (i).
Differentiate equation (7) totally and substitute (Al) and (A2) to obtain
where A =:= Al w L + AHw H = I has been used as weIl. This completes the proof of part (ii).
Proof of Theorem l: Because the tariff enters (34) and (35) Differentiate ,(4) and (35) with respect to lJ1 and x holding 6 0 constant to obtain:
It is obvious from inspection of (A4) and (AS) that only the last term in each denominator differs. Therefore, the RHS of (A4) is larger than the RHS of (AS) if and only if Bd AL < BH" AH'
Because the RHS of (34) and (35) are increasing and linear in I, one can obtain the same result for the PEG specification. Thus, in both mode Is a reduction in the common tariff reduces 6 0 if and only ifR&D is the skill intensive activity.
Totally differentiating equations (7) and (11) yields
Expressions ( The next step of the family's optimization problem is to maximize (l) subject to the
evolution ofwealth (4). Substituting (B2) into (2) and taking into account that the evolution of innovationj(w,s) and prices p(w,s) are taken as given, the Hamiltonian for the intertemporal maximization problem is Substituting (B4) into the intertemporal budget constraint (4) yields
which states that consumption per capita is proportional to total wealth W(t) + Z(t). Because, at time t the value of Z(t) depends on past decisions, the higher is the discounted wage income W(t), the higher is the family's consumption per capita and utility. Therefore, the decision to remain unskilled or to become a skilled worker depends only on maximization of each member's discounted wage income from time t (when a member is bom) to time t + D (when that member dies)). Thus, an individual with ability 6 bom at time t becomes a skilled worker if and only if
Existence of a unique long-run equilibrium: First, we establish that the graph of the full employment of unskilled workers condition is upward sloping and that the graph of the full employment of skilled workers condition is downward sloping. Second, we show that, under reasonable restrictions on the model' s parameters, the downward sIoping curve has a higher vertical intercept than the upward sIoping curve as shown in Figures 2 and 3 ..
Equations (7) and (11) Consider the slope of the graph of equation (34) . The RHS of (34) is increasing in I (the PEG mode!) and x (the TEG mode!) and the LHS\is increasing in 8 0 • Therefore a sufficient but hardly necessary condition for a positive slope is that the RHS of (34) is a decreasing function of e o • The derivative of the RHS of (34) with respect to e o is equal to and since B Le < 0, a sufficient condition for a positive slope of (34) is that expression BALe + ALBa be negative. In other words, this condition impIies that w L AL B Because B = BLw L + BHw H , the positive term in this expression is less than one. In addition, differentiating AL w L + AHwH = l with respect to w L and rearranging tenns yields ALL wLI AL = -l -(AHLwH/A L ) which establishes the negative sign ofexpression (BI2).
Consider the slope of the graph of equation (35) . The RHS increases in x and I and the LHS decreases in 8 0 • Therefore a sufficient condition for the negative slope of (35) is that the B-4 RHS is an increasing function of 6 0 , Differentiating the RHS of (35) with respect to 6 0 yields Because B He > O, a sufficient condition for the slope of (35) All terms in the above expression except A HH are positive and BHw H < B = BHw H + BL w L . In addition, differentiating expression AL w L + AHwH = l with respect to w H yields AHHwH/A H = -l -(ALHWdA~, and therefore the expression in parenthesis is negative as required and (B 13) ho Ids.
The above calculations established the positive slope of (34) and the negative slope of where I = n/2j.1 > O. The tenn in square brackets converges to a strictly positive number as 6 0 approaches zero, given condition (36). The left-hand-side of (B 18) approaches zero as 6 0 -0+ because BL decreases in 6 0 and cannot be negative. Therefore as 6 0 -0+, X has to approach zero.
In addition, when 6 0 = l, (B 18) implies that x is strictly positive. Therefore, under condition (36), the graph of equation (34) starts at the origin and slopes upward as illustrated in Figure 2 .
At 6 0 = l, equation (35) is satisfied only if x = O because all the tenns of the RHS that dependon 6 0 are strictly positive at 6 0 = l. Therefore, the graph of equation (35) 
positive at 6 2 = l. In addition, (B 13) implies that the LHS of (B20) decreases in e 2 • Therefore as k increases, e 2 decreases starting at 6 2 = l. Thus, at k = O, et = O and 6 2 = l and consequently, there exists a low value of k such that (B 19) and (B20) are satisfed with O < at < 6 2 < l. This implies that, under assumption (36), the graphs of equations (34) and (35) have a unique
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there exists a low value ofk such that (B 19) and (B20) are satisfed with 0< 6, < 6 2 < l. This implies that, under assumption (36), the graphs of equations (34) and (35) have a unique intersection for a low value of k. The unique intersection, which is illustrated in Figure 3 generates an equilibrium value ofe o which lies strictly between zero and one. (Q.E.D.)
R-l
